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< Distribution in Efficiency and>  
The Impact of Inter-Organizational 
Systems  
Manoj Chandra, Joseph Cherian, and Aditya Saharia 
College of Business Administration 
University of Illinois at Chicago 
601 S. Morgan Street -- M/C 294 
Chicago, IL 60607 
Introduction  
Application of information technology to facilitate information flows associated with 
coordinating transactions between two are more organizations are commonly known as 
inter-organizational systems (IOS). Such systems, on one hand allow for smoother and 
cheaper linkage between two organizations by the transactions to take place more 
efficiently thus lowering the over all cost of transacting. On the other hand, they allow for 
the initiating firm to achieve an edge over its competition. Such a competitive edge (by 
the initiating) firm is achieved in a two-fold way: (i) by introducing systems which 
require large capital investment, the entry barrier is raised thereby decreasing threat of 
new entries and (ii) by forcing the other party (buyers or suppliers) to invest into 
specialized assets like hardware, software, and skills (which of course are eventually paid 
back by the reduced cost of transacting), thereby increasing the cost of switching. In 
some cases the benefits of an IOS were deemed by the initiator firm to be so significant 
that it provided the other party with the necessary equipment at a no cost. Because of 
their ability to provide the first-mover advantage, IOS have been labeled as "strategic 
systems." Recently, large retailers have used IOS to implement Vendor Managed 
Inventory systems where even the demand analysis and forecasting decisions are 
delegated to the suppliers. Since the supplier has immediate access to the demand data it 
can adjust its production level more quickly in response to fluctuations in the demand. 
Many other retailers and consumer good producers have responded to the competitive 
threat posed by large retailers like Wal-Mart by developing joint warehousing systems, 
which are commonly known by Efficient Consumer Response systems, thereby providing 
benefits of virtual integration without individual firms loosing their identities.  
While in many cases, the focus of IOS has been dyadic relationship between buyers and 
sellers [GASK85, ZAHE94], for some industries, the entire value chain involving many 
different players have been transformed. In distribution channels (or just channels in the 
sequel) products flow through many different stages before (and in some cases even 
after) getting committed to a customer. Since channel members perform interrelated 
activities, the organizational effects of an IOS are not confined to just the immediate 
trading partners linked by the system. Rather, resulting changes percolate throughout the 
channel.  
Problem Statement And Significance 
In this work we study the impact of IOS on the structure of the distribution channels. We 
use a political economy framework suggested by Stern and Reve [STER80] to develop a 
model and motivate propositions as to the effect of IOS on channel structure. Our main 
research hypothesis is that  
H0:  
At the current levels of IT maturity in distribution channels, new IOS 
cannot be treated as strategic systems; rather these systems are defensive 
in nature. 
Defining the appropriate impact of the IOS has considerable significance. If IOS are 
deemed to be strategic in nature, the right initiation policy would be a proactive one (i.e., 
acquire the system as quickly as possible) and right acquisition policy would be to 
custom built the system. If IOS are deemed to be defensive in nature, the right initiation 
policy would be a reactive one (i.e., to postpone acquiring the systems till at least one 
competitor has already started investing in it) and the right to purchase the system from 
an outside vendor.  
Channel Descriptors  
Producers use external agents, called channel members in marketing literature, to move 
products to the final consumers. As Bucklin points out, such intermediaries add value to 
the economy by performing channel functions like (a) providing spatial convenience, (b) 
packaging and repackaging (c) reducing waiting time, and (d) providing product 
assortment [BUCK65, GASK85]. For example, consumers who want to purchase in small 
lots depend on channel members for providing sorting functions. Similarly, consumers 
who face high costs of waiting depend on channel members who can satisfy the demand 
from inventory. Borrowing marketing literature, we use the following terms to describe 
channels:  
Channel length:  
Short channels indicate integration of several channel functions by some channel 
members such as the producer or a large wholesalers. Long channels indicate that 
channel functions are spun off to intermediaries because the market demands 
greater specialization.  
Power distribution and relative location of channel captain :  
Long channels often see conflicts among channel members because of their 
natural tendencies to protect their own interests. In vertical channel relations 
conflicts take form of attempts to set channel prices, shift risks associated with 
excess inventory and stockout's to others, and quality debasement. In horizontal 
relations, conflicts take form of territorial encroachment, free-ridership in 
promotion etc. The channel captain is the member who has power to resolve 
conflict between channel members and to influence the decision variables in the 
marketing strategy of another member at a different level in the channel. When 
channel captains are located close to the consumers the market is better able to 
control production.  
Degree of formalization:  
When the channel relations, including recurrent exchanges, are governed by 
uniform standards so that the information in coordination of channel activities as 
well as resolving channel conflicts are easily defined and observable, the channel 
has a high degree of formalization. When the relations are governed on an ad hoc 
basis or in a bilateral manner, the channel has low degree of formalization.  
External Diversity:  
External diversity refers to the competition faced by a channel member. Thus a 
typical convenience store faces high degree of diversity where as an aircraft 
leasing agency would have low external diversity  
Internal diversity:  
Internal diversity refers to the assortment of products to be handled by a channel 
member. For consumer goods, the assortment of goods handled by a retailer tend 
to be large, while many durable goods are sold through exclusive dealerships, the 
assortment handled by a dealer is limited to products only from one manufacturer.  
Current study 
We use a political economy framework suggested by Stern and Reve [STER80] to 
develop a model and motivate propositions as to the effect of introduction and adoption 
of IOS on channel. The framework borrows from both the transactions cost analysis (See 
for example Williamson, [WILL86] or Malone et al. [MALO87]) and sociopolitical (see 
for example Gaski, [GASK85]) approaches to describe channel structure in terms of 
efficiency of the channel and power exerted by the channel members on each other in a 
dyadic relationships. We propose to generalize the framework to describe channel 
structure is in terms of the channel length and the location of the channel captain. Our 
analysis starts with identifying the information flows associated with channel functions 
which can be broadly grouped into two categories: (i) logistics information which is 
information needed to coordinate physical flows; and (ii) demand information which is 
used to make the procurement decisions at different levels in the channel. The model 
further accounts for the effects of diversity, both internal and external . Using the 
characterization of channels given above we arrive at the following propositions which 
identify changes in the channel as IOS get adopted  
H1: IOS lead to higher degree of centralization (by making private knowledge 
into public information which can be effectively used by a centralized authority)  
H2: IOS leads to shorter channels.  
H3: The location of channel captain moves toward consumers.  
H4: The risk associated with demand and product uncertainties are increasingly 
borne by the producers rather than downstream channel members.  
H5: IOS lead to a higher degree of formalization.  
If found to be valid, H1-H4 would tend to suggest that it is more likely that the 
downstream channel members find the IOS strategic while the upstream members are 
more likely to find them tactical. H5 just suggests that the overall costs of transacting 
reduces because the information relevant to a transaction is easily available to all parties.  
H6: IOS which require specialized resources to implement, shift location of the 
captain towards the initiator.  
H7 When IOS are introduced by a channel captain, the channel captain may 
further consolidate its power.  
H8: Introduction of IOS which support very specialized channel functions (e.g. 
flow of crude through pipelines), the location of channel captain does not get 
effected.  
H9: When an IOS is introduced to replace an existing one, there are insignificant 
shifts in the power  
If found to be valid, H6-H8 identify situations where IOS would indeed have a strategic 
focus while H9 suggest that one the first-mover advantage has been achieved, IOS loose 
their strategic impact.  
Top level information systems executives from businesses in distribution and wholesaling 
industry will be surveyed on their perception on the strategic role of IOS. The 
propositions above would help generate statements for which agreement could be 
measured on a standard Likert type scale. The survey results will be analyzed using the 
Structural Equation Modeling (BAGO82) approach to analyze the data. The SEM 
approach allows us to account for latent variables that do not manifest themselves 
explicitly. For example, the construct of external diversity can be inferred from several 
explicit measurements such as the number of direct competitors, the intensity of 
competition and the distance from the competitors.  
We are also developing models which can provide useful insights into vertical channel 
relations. Currently we are examining the effect of IOS on channel coordination for the 
stylized case of single producer and multiple retailers.  
Centralized and decentralized market scenarios have been considered to study the 
differences in the effects of IOS implementation. IOS can lead to shifts in current 
allocation of costs and profits among channel members. Therefore the much touted 
benefits of virtual integration can only be achieved if we have a framework to provide 
answers to managers on what incentives are needed for the implementation of such 
systems.  
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